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Since the “cosmopolitan turn”
Introduction 
1 has reached the discipline of education, several battle lines have been 
opened in the discourse. One of the major controversies which emerged in this process spins around the 
dichotomy between “an abstract cosmopolitanism from above and a rooted cosmopolitanism from 
below.”2 The charge often implicit against the cosmopolitanism in the “abstract” reading is that it has 
an implicit, or hidden agenda that emphasizes the economic challenges and opportunities the  
progressive globalization presents us with and promotes positive attitudes to mobility, flexibility, and a 
disinterested objective detachment to the detriment of "rooted" ethical attachments to local and national 
cultural values. Cosmopolitanism understood in this sense then seems to be all about breaking away 
from traditional affiliations and detaching oneself from norms in order to enjoy more freely “a style of 
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life” which allows one to “incorporate the manners, habits, languages, and social customs of cities 
throughout the world” like a “parasite, who depends upon the quotidian lives of others to create the 
various local flavors and identities in which he dabbles.” 3  Even if this somewhat antiquated 
conservative criticism of the cosmopolitan attitude might seem hyperbolic from today's perspective, 
some of the worry remains, and rightfully so, I believe. When authors still worry that the new 
cosmopolitanism has “more in common with partners in Manhattan, London, Singapore or Hong Kong 
than with locals or nationals that are not plugged into a network of global connectedness,”4 they are 
right at least insofar as much of the literature on the new cosmopolitanism appears indeed as not taking 
serious enough the challenges posed by the inherently normative dimension of cosmopolitan thought. 
As Marianna Papastephanou has pointed out, the critical-ethical dimension seems to remain occluded 
in a major part of the sociologically oriented research on cosmopolitanism.5
The present paper will argue that the critical dimension of cosmopolitan thought should be 
brought to the fore and suggests that the critique of reification, which recently received renewed 
interest by philosophers of the so-called third generation Frankfurt School,
 
6 can serve as a vital tool for 
finding a solution to the rootedness vs. rootlessness debate which lies square to the established 
dichotomy and allows to articulate a critical approach to cosmopolitanism in education. Reification will 
be explained as a second-order process of forgetting a primary recognition which leads to severe 
pathologies on a socio-ontological level, beyond being a merely moral failure or epistemic mistake. As 
I have argued elsewhere,7 the critique of reification, if appropriately adapted, can contribute to an 
understanding and provide an explanation for many of the specific normative failures characteristic of 
today's educational institutions and practices. While reification theory is grounded in everyday 
experiences, it does not end with the mere analysis of our thinking, our values, and forms of action; 
critical theory questions our attitudes and experiences so as to reveal their inherent critical potential. 
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The main thesis I wish to put forth in this paper is that an interpretation of cosmopolitanism as a 
critique of reification is promising with regard to dissolving the theoretical conflict between the 
understanding of cosmopolitanism in education as an abstract universalism in opposition to a rooted 
particularist culturalism. Cosmopolitanism in the sense proposed in the paper is not exhausted by 
guaranteeing global economic competitiveness, but stands as a constant reminder that – in principle – 
all moral and epistemic issues, all religious and cultural convictions – no matter if they are beliefs of a 
minority or a majority – can and should always also be objects of reflection and critique. This 
understanding of cosmopolitanism as a critique of reification is one that I believe can be found already 
in Diogenes’ famous response “I am a citizen of the world.”8
 
 In my view, Diogenes did not wish to 
affirm another substantive, cosmopolitan identity instead of the then customary way of determining 
one’s own identity in close connection with the particular polis to which one belongs. Rather, the 
declaration should be read as resisting an acknowledgment of conventional identifications with a 
critical intent. In this way Diogenes accomplishes with his statement something which Emerson would 
have called an aversion to conformity. This aversion aims at a critique of certain norms or standards 
which he perceived as inadequate because they had become reified – thus stifling rather than enabling 
creative human activity. 
In his 2005 Tanner Lectures on reification Honneth put forth an interpretation of Lukács' theory of 
reification which tries to revive key ideas and show their productivity for analyzing contemporary 
society.
Honneth’s Renewal of the Critique of Reification 
9 Honneth suggests a recognition theoretic interpretation which understands reification as a 
second order process, as a specific forgetfulness of a primary form of recognition. As is well-known, 
Lukács determines the concept of reification based on the analyses of alienation and of the “fetish 
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character of the commodity” developed by Marx. By uniting Marx' criticism of capitalism with central 
motifs of the theories of Max Weber and Georg Simmel in a comprehensive theory of reification in the 
core part of the essay collection Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (first published in 1925), Georg 
Lukács extends Marx' perspective significantly in a way that is essential for its adaptability to today's 
discussion as it allows for a multidimensional and thus more adequate description of modern societies. 
As Lukács shows, it is not only due to the functional logic of expanding capitalism itself that in 
addition to the economic sphere also other societal spheres are penetrated by the commodity logic, but 
the process of rationalization itself contributes to the spreading of instrumental thought and action into 
the social realm.  
Honneth’s interpretation of the notion of reification takes Lukács’ analysis of the contemplative, 
disinterested attitude of the wage-worker towards himself and his own work as a starting point. Instead 
of the “official” idealistic line, Honneth points to some more moderate passages that he finds 
interesting in Lukács where the praxis that is destroyed through commodity exchange is described in 
terms of “empathetic engagement” or “interestedness.” (101) The way in which commodity exchange 
affects human relations is not just by reifying situational elements, but by compelling “subjects […] to 
behave as detached observers, rather than as active participants in social life.” (99) He argues that it is 
in this contemplative attitude, which spreads from the realm of work to all other societal realms, as 
Lukács shows, that we forget the primacy of recognition over cognition; i.e. the genetic and categorical 
primacy of a compassionate and interested involvement in the world over the neutral observation of 
objective reality. The form of recognition Honneth appeals to in this context must not be confounded 
with the forms of recognition he outlines in his Struggle for Recognition. The form of recognition 
which is being forgotten in modes of reifying thought is situated at a more fundamental level as 
becomes obvious in the authors who Honneth draws on in order to elucidate his notion. Building on 
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Heidegger’s notion of “care,” Dewey’s notion of “involvement,” and Cavell’s notion of 
“acknowledgment,” Honneth’s conception of recognition aims at “a wholly elementary form of 
intersubjective activity, but one that does not yet imply the perception of the specific value of another 
person.” (123) This form of recognition “lies below the threshold at which that particular form of 
mutual recognition takes place in which the other person’s specific characteristics are affirmed.” (123)  
In contrast to Lukács, however, Honneth is very careful not to classify all forms of 
objectification of our thought as reification. Rather, it is only “at the moment in which our reflexive 
efforts lose consciousness of their origin in an act of antecedent recognition that we cross the threshold 
to pathology, skepticism, or—as Adorno would have called it—identity thought.” (129) Reification as 
the forgetfulness of recognition thus means specifically that “we lose the ability to understand 
immediately the behavioral expressions of other persons as making claims on us. [...] We may indeed 
be capable in a cognitive sense of perceiving the full spectrum of human expressions, but we lack, so to 
speak, the feeling of connection that would be necessary for us to be affected by the expressions we 
perceive.” (129) 
In the course of his analysis Honneth then extends his thesis of reification as forgetfulness of 
recognition from inter-subjective reification processes to the reification of our natural surroundings and 
of ourselves. In order to characterize the structure of the reification of our natural surroundings he 
draws on Adorno's analyses again. The primary inter-subjective recognition includes, as he tries to 
show, to respect the subjective meaning aspects that fellow humans attach to specific natural objects so 
that reifying these objects consists in a forgetfulness of these existential aspects of meaning which 
others associate with them. As for the third form of reifying self-relations, these can take two basic 
shapes. The primary expressivist character of our own emotions, attitudes and desires can be distorted 
in a cognitivist way if we understand them as things that merely have to be “detected” and then put to 
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use in a socially useful way. But they can also be distorted in a constitutivist way if we understand 
them as something to be created at will in order to fit societal functions. In these self-reifying modes 
we forget the primary recognition of our own desires, emotions, and intentions in the sense of 
forgetfulness about their being worthy of an explorative appropriation and expression which allows for 
the development of a self-relation to begin with. 
After this short look at the different forms that reification can take, I would like to turn to the 
origin and social causes of reification that Honneth names. The first and most general origin Honneth 
mentions is that the processes which allow for and facilitate the purpose of observing and cognizing our 
surroundings can become independent of the context in which they originated. (Cf. 130) Secondly, 
however, Honneth importantly sees that also “series of thought schemata” may lead to “a selective 
interpretation of social facts” and “significantly reduce our attentiveness for meaningful circumstances 
in a given situation.” (131) In this way his approach is able to incorporate ideological causes of 
reification which – by way of a more or less radical – de-contextualization and fixating of thought 
schemata give rise to reification in the sense of a total forgetfulness of prior, and meaning-constitutive 
recognitional structures. In response to the criticisms by Butler, Geuss and Lear, Honneth further 
specifies “a certain kind of lasting, routine praxis” (155) as the social cause of reification: “Subjects 
can forget or learn later to deny the elementary recognition that they generally grant to every other 
human being, if they continuously contribute to a highly one-sided form of praxis that necessitates 
abstraction from the 'qualitative' characteristics of human beings.” (155; emphasis C.S.) 
I see two particular strengths in Honneth's interpretation of Lukács. Firstly, he introduces a 
helpful distinction between innocuous cases of objectification (instrumentalization, or de-
personalization) and dangerous, harmful, destructive pathological processes of reification. Secondly, 
we need to stress that his discussion of social sources for reification does not reduce to commodity 
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exchange only, but is able to include other sources, such as ideologies.10
 
 I believe that this is of utmost 
importance in times where education sciences themselves seem to be utterly unaware of the ideological 
nature of the research paradigms, slogans, and key words they uncritically import from the fields of 
economics or politics without paying attention to whether these are compatible with intrinsically 
pedagogical goals, aims and self-understandings. Lastly, I believe that Honneth's theory allows us to 
describe with great precision the reifying understandings of the cosmopolitan idea which lead to the 
problematic attitude of a mere observer of human life who reifies other people, objects, nature, and 
ultimately his or her own emotions and abilities. It is this attitude, I believe, which has been criticized 
by cosmopolitanism's critics (and which can in this way be shown to be understandable if not justified 
in some sense). At the same time Honneth's theory of reification might help to clarify that the core of 
the cosmopolitan idea is directly opposed to these reifying mechanisms.  
If we understand reification as a second-order process of forgetting a primary recognition then we can 
come to see that the choice between the culturalist emphasis on the necessity of local contexts for 
meaning to be established and the cosmopolitan universalist abstraction is wrongly put. Instead of 
consisting in a selective, reifying attitude of appreciating the new worldwide possibilities of 
consumption, the cosmopolitan attitude can be reframed as a meta-reflexive form of boundedness in the 
sense of taking responsibility for resisting the reifying attitudes modern capitalism enhances. 
Cosmopolitanism understood in this sense could mean to remind ourselves of the primary form of 
recognition inherent in our relations towards every human being, toward nature, and toward ourselves, 
which is first constitutive of the meaningfulness of human action and interaction. The cosmopolitan 
attitude is then not one of abstract, merely observing detachment from all cultural or normative 
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boundaries, but a regaining of an interested and engaged involvement with others regardless of whether 
they share our background or not, with nature as well as with ourselves. In this way cosmopolitanism 
can mean to constantly work against and out of the naivety involved in letting the constructs, the 
frames of thought as well as the practices that evolve through human interaction become reified entities 
which take on a life of their own and start to determine human life in turn, inhibiting not only our 
interested involvement with the world and ourselves, but also the flexibility and openness of our 
thought for re-assessing our values, perceptions and meanings in different contextual circumstances. In 
my view, cosmopolitan education has to be about resisting being bound by reified entities, and finding, 
founding and finding back to non-reifying ways of boundedness.  
Furthermore, it is in light of the critique of reification that we can understand the difference 
between cosmopolitanism as an economic or cultural opportunism of a small global elite and 
cosmopolitanism in the sense of a moral and political endeavor that takes responsibility for making the 
situational and historical contexts of our own claims and demands visible, where such a re-
contextualization might make it harder to spill blood “in the name of universality, but for the sake of 
home and property.”11 Such re-contextualization might also be helpful with regard to approaching, 
exploring and understanding another person's, another culture's, or another nation's moral, political, and 
economic claims. Rather than reducing the meaning of cosmopolitanism to the pleasurable aspects of 
globalization that allow for ever more cultural consumption to those who (have the means to) 
enthusiastically embrace “the opportunities provided by the diverse societal culture which characterizes 
the Anglophone society of the United States,”12 as Kymlicka rightly criticizes, the cosmopolitan virtue 
can then take on a more profound dimension and cut deeper to much more “bloody truths.”13 I hope to 
have given some convincing arguments for taking a new look at reification, one of the most central 
notions of classical Critical Theory, in relation to re-thinking a cosmopolitan outlook in education in 
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the course of this paper. The educational debates on cosmopolitanism have often centered on a “drastic 
choice between the old universalism of the grand narrative of ahistorical cosmopolitanism and the new 
isolationism of small narratives unable to cross divides.” (609) The critique of reification, as renewed 
by Honneth, provides the means to reveal this dichotomy as false and irrelevant. Neither the 
reifications of a universal outlook leading to an equalizing, normalizing indifference to the particular 
context, nor the reifications of a particularist outlook leading to an over-stylization of the difference to 
the other prove helpful. The distinction which should matter is that between a badly understood 
cosmopolitanism which means nothing but the economically inspired extension of reification on a 
global scale, and between a critical cosmopolitanism in the sense of a moral and political plea for 
responsibility towards withstanding, untangling and going beyond such reifications on a global scale. 
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